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Abstract –  This article assesses the possible impact of the Care Act 2014 on the provision of social care for elderly and 
disabled adults in England, focusing particularly on the balance between ensuring adequate care and affecting the 
property rights of the recipients of social care, their families, and others who might have legal or moral claims to their 
property (especially via inheritance). The article uses the European Convention on Human Rights to measure the Act's 
implications, arguing that normative problems remain despite the Act's general compatibility with the Convention. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The legislation that became the Care Act 2014 was described as ‘the biggest change in the law 
governing…care and support in England since the National Assistance Act 1948’,1 and it was 
sufficiently contentious for the Labour opposition to try to stop the relevant Bill from receiving a 
second reading in Parliament due to its alleged inadequacy.
2
 This article’s aim is to assess the likely 
impact of the Act (specifically Part 1) on the provision of social care for the increasing numbers of 
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1
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Bill: Report (2012-13, HL 143, HC 822) para 41. 
2
 See T Spencer-Lane, Care Act Manual (Sweet & Maxwell 2014) para A1-015 for discussion. 
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adults
3
 who require it, particularly on the balance between ensuring adequate care and affecting (via 
‘asset-based welfare’)4 the property rights of the recipients of social care, their families, and others 
who might have legal or moral claims to their property (especially via inheritance). In doing so, it 
evaluates whether the rhetoric surrounding the Act matches reality. Much of Part 1 of the Act was 
commenced in April 2015,
5
 although the implementation of some of its most significant funding 
reforms (including a lifetime cap on care costs to be met by an individual) has been delayed from 
2016 until 2020.
6
  
Social care raises difficulties for doctrinal legal scholars, given its political and fiscal 
sensitivity. While legislation must underpin it, it is not wholly or even mainly a distinctly legal 
issue. This was seemingly recognized by the Law Commission in its report that effectively led to 
the Care Act
7
 (alongside the Dilnot report on care funding).
8
 The article therefore seeks to measure 
                                                 
3
 See, eg, R Wittenberg et al, Projections of Demand for and Costs of Social Care for Older People in England, 2010 to 
2030, under Current and Alternative Funding Systems: Report of Research for the Commission on Funding of Care and 
Support (PSSRU Discussion Paper 2811/2, 2012). 
4
 L Murphy, ‘Asset-based Welfare’ in Science Direct, International Encyclopaedia of Housing and Home (Elsevier 
2012), cited by N Hopkins and E Laurie, ‘Social Citizenship, Housing Wealth and the Cost of Social Care: Is the Care 
Act 2014 “Fair”?’ (2015) 78 MLR 112. 
5
 See, eg, Explanatory Notes to the Care Act 2014, para 420. 
6
 Department of Health, ‘Letter from Rt Hon Alistair Burt MP: Delay in the Implementation of the Cap on Care Costs’ 
(July 17, 2015), <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/delay-in-the-implementation-of-the-cap-on-care-costs> 
accessed 20 February 2016. 
7
 See, eg, Law Commission, Adult Social Care (Law Com No 326, 2011) para 1.19; cf, eg, J Herring, Caring and the 
Law (Hart Publishing 2013); Hopkins and Laurie, (n 4); MA Fineman, The Autonomy Myth: A Theory of Dependency 
(New Press 2004).  
8
 Commission on Funding of Care and Support, Fairer Care Funding (2011). 
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the impact of the Care Act using the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’),9 whose 
status in domestic law can require even the most doctrinal scholar to engage with difficult political 
and resource-based questions. In doing so, the author hopes to avoid the tendency in legal 
approaches to social care described by Carr (inspired by Harvey),
10
 namely ‘an adherence to the 
rule of law which operates to embed neo-liberal rationalities [whereby a] muscular black letter law 
stance applies even when there is available an alternative legal device – in this instance dignity and 
human rights – and the popular will to soften the consequences for those most vulnerable to the 
retreat of the state’.11  
Other human rights treaties are more obviously tailored to the protection of those requiring 
social care, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006.
12
 However, 
the ECHR (for the time being)
13
 is incorporated into English Law via the Human Rights Act 1998 
and directly enforceable by individuals. Carr and Hunter argue that ‘[h]uman rights…provide an 
important plank of the legal welfare which has supplanted the social welfare of the immediate post-
war period’.14 At the same time, they criticize some recent judicial approaches15 for the ‘the 
mentality…that if law just tries harder, perhaps through the deployment of human rights, it can do 
                                                 
9
 See, eg, T Murphy, Health and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2013) 9-13 for a justification of the use of ‘human 
rights legal method’ in relation to health. 
10
 D Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (OUP 2005). 
11
 H Carr, ‘Rational Men and Difficult Women – R (on the application of McDonald) v. Royal Borough of Kensington 
and Chelsea [2011] UKSC 33’ (2012) 34 Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 219, 220. 
12
 See, eg, L Pritchard-Jones, ‘Night-time Care, Article 8 and the European Court of Human Rights: A Missed 
Opportunity?’ (2015) 37 Journal of Social Welfare & Family Law 108; R Kayess and P French, ‘Out of Darkness into 
Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 Human Rights LR 1. 
13
 Cf, eg, N Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ [2014] Public Law 529, 545-46. 
14
 H Carr and C Hunter, ‘Are Judicial Approaches to Adult Social Care at a Dead-End?’ (2012) 21 Social & Legal 
Studies 73, 79. 
15
 Carr and Hunter’s targets were specifically those in YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 27.  
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its work’, opining that they ‘inspire little hope in the law as a means to solve contemporary 
problems’.16  In any case, the Convention can legitimately be considered the most influential human 
rights treaty for English Law, and an analysis of adult social care’s compatibility with it has value. 
It is significant that the Care Act has specifically extended the protection of the Human Rights Act 
to all those receiving care from a registered (and potentially private) provider either in their own 
home or a care home, where the care is arranged or at least partially funded by a local authority 
(‘LA’) under various provisions.17 As will become clear, however, the deferential approach of both 
the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) and (somewhat less explicably) national courts as 
regards social policy means that the level of compatibility of the law in this area has in significant 
respects not undergone a fundamental shift following the Care Act. The threshold for a breach of 
the Convention, as regards both the provision and funding of care and its consequences for property 
rights, is very high. This, in turn, demonstrates the limitations of the Convention in safeguarding 
certain types of right. 
 The article’s body is divided into two inevitably overlapping sections. Section 2 considers 
the provision of care, and Section 3 considers the funding of care. A reason for the overlap is that 
resources will often be a key consideration in decisions on the provision of care. As Herring 
correctly asserts, while ‘[t]here is much to be welcomed’ in the proposals embodied in the Act, ‘at 
the end of the day it will be the levels of funding which are key, rather than legislative structure’.18  
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 Carr and Hunter (n 14) 86. 
17
 Care Act 2014, s 73. Cf Health and Social Care Act 2008, s 145 and YL v Birmingham City Council [2007] UKHL 
27.  
18
 Herring (n 7) 143. 
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2. The Provision of Social Care 
 
A. The Mechanics of the Care Act 
 
Adult social care is the responsibility of LAs in England, though ‘few…are now involved in the 
direct delivery of care and support services’, with most services operated by private, for-profit 
providers.
19
 It is distinct from health care provided by the National Health Service, and it will be 
seen in the next section that this distinction assumes particular importance as regards the funding of 
care. It is frequently criticised, and Herring asserts that ‘whether the ability to care [for oneself] is 
seen as an aspect of health promotion or dealing with the consequences of ill-health, the distinction 
[between free health care and potentially charged-for social care] is hard to justify’, and has 
suggested that ‘the division has more to do with attempts to cut costs to the state, while holding on 
to the claim that health services are provided free at the point of delivery, than…being based 
on…sound policy’.20 
In any case, the NHS operates via the Secretary of State’s duty to ‘continue the promotion in 
England of a comprehensive health service designed to secure improvement’21 ‘in the physical and 
mental health of the people of England’22 and ‘in the prevention, diagnosis and treatment of 
physical and mental illness’.23 There is no equivalent statutory definition of social care in 
                                                 
19
 D Kelly, ‘Editorial: Reflecting on the Implications of the Care Act 2014 for Care Providers’ (2013) 7 Journal of Care 
Services Management 74, 74. 
20
 J. Herring, Medical Law and Ethics, 5th edn (OUP 2014) 51. 
21
 National Health Service Act 2006, s 1(1). 
22
 National Health Service Act 2006, s 1(1)(a). 
23
 National Health Service Act 2006, s.1(1)(b). 
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legislation,
24
 although it has been said that it ‘supports people of all ages with certain physical, 
cognitive or age-related conditions in carrying out personal care or domestic routines’.25  
 It is also significant that the NHS mostly owes duties to the population as a whole, whereas 
LAs owe some enforceable public law duties to individuals.
26
 In essence, the National Health 
Service Act 2006 imposes a duty on a clinical commissioning group to provide health care services 
to patients to such extent as it considers necessary to meet all reasonable requirements.
27
 
According to the Government, ‘[t]he Care Act and supporting guidance does not seek to 
alter the boundary of responsibilities of [LAs] and the NHS’,28 despite the Act’s emphasis on 
integration.
29
 Section 22 of the 2014 Act largely codifies the approach of the courts in interpreting 
the old boundary,
30
 as well as giving the Secretary of State the power to make regulations to close 
the gap between health and social care. An LA may not ‘meet needs…by providing or arranging for 
the provision of a service or facility that is required to be provided under’31 the 2006 Act, unless 
                                                 
24
 See, eg, Herring (n 7) 136-138. 
25
 Commission on Funding of Care and Support, (n 8) 4. 
26
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-268; see also, eg, R (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough 
Council [2011] UKSC 33 [69] (Baroness Hale). E Wicks, Human Rights and Healthcare (Hart Publishing 2007), ch 2 
considers whether there is a right to healthcare in the context of the NHS. 
27
 National Health Service Act, s 3; R (Condliff) v North Staffordshire Primary Care Trust [2011] EWCA Civ 910 [4] 
(Toulson LJ). 
28
 Department of Health, Response to the Consultation on Draft Regulations and Guidance for Implementation of Part 1 
of the Care Act 2014 (Cm 895536, 2014). 
29
 Care Act 2014, s 3; Department of Health, Care and Support Statutory Guidance: Issued under the Care Act 2014 
(2014) ch 15. 
30
 See, eg, National Assistance Act 1948, s 21(8); R v North and East Devon HA ex p Coughlan
 
[2001] QB 213 (CA).
 
31
 Care Act 2014, s 22(1). There are similar boundary issues with respect to housing law: s 23; see, generally, 
Department of Health (n 29) [10.23]. 
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that would be ‘merely incidental or ancillary to doing something else to meet needs’32 and ‘the 
service or facility…would be of a nature that the [LA] could be expected to provide’,33 although the 
basic rules are finessed. The Government sought to clarify the statutory guidance
34
 following 
feedback,
35
 but refused to provide examples of what ‘merely incidental or ancillary’ means. 
 In the 2001 case of R (on the application of A) v Lambeth London Borough Council, Scott 
Baker J. described how:  
 
Community care legislation has grown piecemeal though numerous statutes over the last 
half century. There are many statutes aimed at different targets whose provisions are drawn 
in differing language. Each Act contains its own duties and powers. Specific duties have to 
be distinguished from target or general duties and duties from discretions. Sometimes a 
[LA] has several ways in which it can meet an obligation. Some provisions overlap with 
others and the inter-relationship is not always easy.
36
 
 
Spencer-Lane nevertheless notes that ‘the need for law reform did not arise solely because of an 
inadequate legal structure’.37 He emphasizes the Law Commission’s ‘more fundamental reasons for 
reform’, its criticism of adult social care law for ‘perpetuating out-dated and discriminatory 
concepts’, and its contrasting of ‘the strong duty to provide residential care to older and disabled 
                                                 
32
 Care Act 2014, s 22(1)(a). 
33
 Care Act 2014, s 22(1)(b). 
34
 Department of Health (n 29) [6.68]. 
35
 Department of Health (n 28) 36. 
36
 [2001] EWHC (Admin) 376 [24]. See, eg, National Assistance Act 1948, Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 
1970, Disabled Persons (Services, Consultation and Representation) Act 1986, National Health Service and Community 
Care Act 1990. 
37
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para A1-006.  
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people, with the less-certain rights to community and home-based care provision’ in the National 
Assistance Act 1948.
38
 His views on the Act and social care law in general must of course be read 
in light of the fact that he was engaged as a lawyer on the associated Law Commission project. 
According to the Department of Health, the Care Act 2014 ‘creates a single, consistent route 
to establishing an entitlement to public care and support for all adults with [relevant] needs’.39 The 
Act also seeks to prevent care and support needs from arising, and to reduce and delay them.
40
 It 
contains a new framework for the ‘safeguarding’ of adults at risk of abuse or neglect,41 which will 
in principle contribute to its protection of human rights.
42
 It includes oversight provisions
43
 and 
attempts to ensure continuity of care in case of private provider failure.
44
 As well as the funding 
reforms already mentioned and to be analysed in detail later, the Act puts personal budgets on a 
statutory footing for the first time,
45
 and it will be seen that these assume significance in the funding 
context. 
 The Care Act opens with a new statutory well-being principle.
46
 It provides that ‘[t]he 
general duty of a [LA], in exercising a function under [Part 1] in the case of an individual, is to 
                                                 
38
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para A1-006; Law Commission (n 7) eg Part I. See also Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons 
Act 1970, and, eg, R (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 33 [65] 
(Baroness Hale). 
39
 Department of Health, Factsheet 2 (2014) 1. 
40
 Care Act 2014, s 2. 
41
 Care Act 2014, ss 42-47; see also ss 67-68 on independent advocacy.  
42
 See, generally, Herring (n 7) 279-284, but cf 298-311. 
43
 Care Act 2014, ss 53-57. 
44
 Care Act 2014, ss 58-52. 
45
 Care Act 2014, s 26; Department of Health, Factsheet 4 (2014); see, generally, C Needham and J Glasby, Debates in 
Personalisation (Policy Press 2014). 
46
 Care Act 2014, s 1. 
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promote that individual’s well-being’,47 with ‘well-being’ defined as encompassing several 
elements
48
 and a number of matters being specified as mandatory relevant considerations.
49
   While 
the principle is laudable, the Government has admitted that it is ‘designed to set out the overarching 
purpose of care and support into which specific duties…fit, rather than require a[n] [LA] to 
undertake any particular action in…itself’.50 It is, however, intended to signify ‘a shift from… 
duties…to provide particular services, to the concept of “meeting needs”’.51 Both the Law 
Commission
52
 and Spencer-Lane
53
 compare the well-being principle to the governing welfare 
principle in the Children Act 1989.
54
 But the welfare principle is more mandatory in nature because 
welfare must be a court’s ‘paramount’ consideration where it applies. Slasberg and Beresford 
criticize the absence of a standard of well-being in the Care Act’s principle,55 and the final statutory 
guidance crucially states that ‘[t]he Care Act’s approach to “meeting needs”, as opposed to duties to 
provide…services, is not intended to place additional requirements on [LAs]’.56 One judge 
confirmed that the section 1 duty ‘is worked out in many particular respects and most of them, 
…when properly understood, accord a large measure of discretion to the [LA]’.57 
                                                 
47
 Care Act 2014, s 1(1). 
48
 Care Act 2014, s 1(2). 
49
 Care Act 2014, s1(3). 
50
 Department of Health (n 28) 11. 
51
 Department of Health (n 29) paras 1-9, 10.10. 
52
 Law Commission (n 7) para 4.1. 
53
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-003. 
54
 Children Act 1989, s 1. 
55
 C Slasberg and P Beresford, ‘Government Guidance for the Care Act: Undermining Ambitions for Change?’ (2014) 
10 Disability & Society 1677, 1677-8.  
56
 Department of Health (n 29) para 23.16. 
57
 R (on the application of SG) v Haringey LBC [2015] EWHC 2579 (Admin) [23] (Deputy Judge John Bowers QC). 
Final Version to be published in (2016) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 
 10 
 Many of the details of what the Act introduces are contained in regulations. This arguably 
makes the provisions more obscure and less accessible than they would be if they were in the Act 
itself. It should be noted, however, that previously most details about assessment were in mere 
guidance.
58
 The same is true of eligibility for non-residential care under the old system,
59
 and 
charging for non-residential services.
60
 So there has in fact been an ‘upgrade’ in the authority of 
provisions governing some matters, which could be a positive development for the rule of law. 
 Under section 9 of the 2014 Act, ‘[w]here it appears to a[n] [LA] that an adult may have 
needs for care and support, the authority must assess’61 ‘whether the adult does have [such] 
needs’,62 and if so what they are.63 This ‘needs assessment’ must be carried out ‘regardless of the 
authority’s view of’64 the adult’s level of need65 or financial resources.66  The only clear exception 
to the duty is where a person with capacity and who is not experiencing or at risk of abuse or 
neglect refuses the assessment.
67
 Further, ‘[t]he eligibility determination cannot take place until an 
assessment has been completed, except…where the [LA] is meeting urgent needs’.68 As for the 
financial assessment (considered in the next section of this article), the statutory guidance concedes 
                                                 
58
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-134. 
59
 ibid para 1-148. 
60
 ibid para 1-219. 
61
 Care Act 2014, s 9(1). 
62
 Care Act 2014, s 9(1)(a). 
63
 Care Act 2014, s 9(1)(b). 
64
 Care Act 2014, s 9(3) 
65
 Care Act 2014, s 9(3)(a). 
66
 Care Act 2014, s 9(3)(b); Department of Health (n 29) para 6.13. 
67
 Care Act 2014, s 11. 
68
 Department of Health (n 29) para 6.12. 
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that it ‘may in practice run parallel to the needs assessment’, but is adamant that ‘it must never 
influence an assessment of needs’.69 
 A focus on continual assessment (without necessarily meeting needs) has been criticized.
70
 
The Law Commission recommended a two-tier approach, the first of which involves the LA 
providing information advice and assistance without assessment.
71
 This is reflected in the 
distinction between sections 2-6 and 9-13.
72
  
Spencer-Lane notes that ‘[t]he Care Act clearly delineates between the needs assessment 
and decisions about service provision’, since the duty in section 9 (intended to have the same effect 
as section 47(1) of the NHS and Community Care Act 1990)
73
 ‘does not contain any reference to 
the care and support that might be provided following an assessment’ (set out in section 8).74 The 
consequence of this separation is apparently that ‘[o]nly once needs have been identified should 
they be evaluated against an eligibility framework and a decision made about whether the person is 
entitled to care and support’.75 Lord Brown in R (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal 
London Borough Council held that resources were relevant to the needs assessment under the pre-
Care Act law.
76
 That said, in the later pre-Care Act Supreme Court case of R (KM) v 
Cambridgeshire County Council, it was held that resources were irrelevant to the assessment of 
needs but relevant to whether it was necessary for the LA to provide a service, the nature and extent 
                                                 
69
 Department of Health (n 29) para 6.12. 
70
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-093. 
71
 Law Commission (n 7) paras 5.3-5.16. 
72
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-093. 
73
 ibid para 1-099. 
74
 ibid para 1-100. 
75
 ibid para 1-100. 
76
 [2011] UKSC 33 [8], applying R v Gloucestershire County Council, ex p Barry [1997] AC 584 (HL). Cf [2011] 
UKSC 33 [72] (Baroness Hale). 
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of any necessary service, and the reasonable cost of such a service.
77
 It seems likely that the 
judiciary will approach the new provisions in the same way.
78
  
The assessment will be the first stage of establishing whether a person has eligible needs 
counting towards the new cap on care costs (if and when that cap is implemented),
79
 considered in 
the next section of this article. As a result, ‘people and their families will have a significant 
economic interest in establishing that they have eligible needs [by requesting an assessment] 
because that is when the meter starts ticking for…free care and support’,80 and the statutory 
guidance anticipates that ‘a significant number of people who would previously have arranged and 
paid for their own care may approach the [LA] for support in accessing care’, or a needs 
assessment.
81
 This makes the theoretical irrelevance to the needs assessment of financial resources 
particularly significant.
82
  
The statutory guidance concerning the nature of the assessment is extensive,
83
 but the 
system truly hinges on the ‘eligibility determination’.84 The Act introduces a new statutory national 
eligibility threshold for social care (establishing the level of need that an LA must meet),
85
 
ultimately contained in the Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations 2015.
86
 An LA can 
choose to meet non-eligible needs in addition.
87
 The Law Commission had recommended that the 
                                                 
77
 [2012] UKSC 23; see, eg, Herring (n 7) 147-49. 
78
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-099. 
79
 ibid para 1-093; Care Act 2014, s 15. 
80
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-093. 
81
 Department of Health (n 29) para 23.43. 
82
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-101. 
83
 Department of Health (n 29) ch 6. 
84
 Department of Health (n 29) para 6.53. 
85
 Care Act 2014, s 13; s 18. 
86
 SI 2015/313 (‘CSECR’). 
87
 Care Act 2014, s 19. 
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legislation anticipate either a national threshold or local thresholds,
88
 but the government was firmer 
on the importance of a national threshold.
89
 Nevertheless, differences in interpretation will remain.
90
 
The Act’s Impact Assessment admits that pre-Act ‘[a]ccess to care and support varies across the 
country, with different authorities setting different thresholds for eligibility and very broad 
variations in how these thresholds are interpreted’, such that ‘[i]ndividuals who have the same 
needs can be eligible for care and support in one [area] but not…another…, even where the [LA] 
nominally sets the same local threshold based on national guidance’.91 Moreover, the Government’s 
intention (and Slasberg and Beresford’s prediction)92 is that the threshold will replicate pre-existing 
practice, which continues discrimination based upon area of residence and limits the Act’s impact.  
The intention behind the draft regulations for the Care Act was to replicate the pre-Act 
‘substantial’ needs threshold.93 That threshold was contained in mere statutory guidance (at least in 
respect of non-residential care),
94
 the Fair Access to Care Services (‘FACS’) guidance.95 The FACS 
guidance contains four bands of needs – ‘critical’, ‘substantial’, ‘moderate’ and ‘low’ – used by 
LAs to specify which level they would meet, taking account of their resources and other factors.  
                                                 
88
 Law Commission (n 7) para 6.17. 
89
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-149. 
90
 ibid para 1-149. 
91
 Department of Health, Impact Assessment: The Care Act 2014: Regulations and guidance for implementation of Part 
1 of the Act in 2015/16 (IA No 6107, 2014) para 2.1. 
92
 Slasberg and Beresford (n 55) 1689. 
93
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-164. 
94
 Cf, eg, Law Commission, Adult Social Care: A Consultation Paper (Law Com CP 192, 2010) Part 7 for discussion of 
residential care provided under National Assistance Act 1948, s 21. 
95
 Social Care Institute for Excellence, Fair Access to Care Services (FACS): Prioritising Eligibility for Care and 
Support (2013); see, eg, Law Commission (n 94) paras [6.5]-[6.18]; R (McDonald) v Kensington and Chelsea Royal 
London Borough Council [2011] UKSC 33 [8] (Lord Brown). 
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During the consultation exercise on the draft regulations, however, ‘[a] majority of [LAs] 
felt the…regulations would make more people eligible than is currently the case, and thus increase 
costs’.96 The requirement for two or more relevant ‘inabilities’ (discussed immediately below) was 
apparently added to the regulations after the consultation, and empirical evidence suggests that the 
Government has been essentially successful in its replication aims.
97
 
In order to fall within the national eligibility threshold, there are three cumulative conditions 
in the Regulations.
98
 The first is that the adult’s needs arise from or are related to a physical or 
mental impairment or illness. Rather mysteriously, the new guidance specifies that the LA must be 
satisfied that the needs are not caused by ‘other circumstantial factors’,99 while providing that a 
formal diagnosis should be unnecessary. Perhaps the reference to such factors excludes needs 
generated by excessive working hours or similar. Spencer-Lane feared that the original wording 
‘due to a physical or mental impairment or illness’ (emphasis added) imported a medical test, risked 
excluding drug and alcohol addicts, and contradicted the Law Commission’s view that there should 
be no medical-legal categorisation.
100
 But the final wording may be looser. 
The second requirement is that as a result of the needs, the adult is unable to achieve two or 
more specified outcomes. This effectively imposes a de minimis threshold that might be useful, and 
few people with real need would be unable to achieve only one of the outcomes in the relevant 
sense. But the multiplicity requirement undermines the importance of each individual outcome. An 
inability for the purposes of the Regulations means
101
 that the adult is unable to achieve the 
                                                 
96
 Department of Health (n 28) 20. 
97
 J-L Fernández, T Snell and J Marczak, An Assessment of the Impact of the Care Act 2014 Eligibility Regulations 
(PSSRU Discussion Paper DP2905, 2015). 
98
 CSECR, r 2; Department of Health (n 29) paras 6.103-6.104.  
99
 Department of Health (n 29) para 6.105 
100
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-166; Law Commission (n 7) para 12.33. 
101
 CSECR, r 2(3). 
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outcome without assistance, can do so only in a manner causing ‘significant pain, distress or 
anxiety’, in one that ‘endangers or is likely to endanger the health or safety of the adult, or…others’ 
or in one that ‘takes significantly longer than would normally be expected’. The relevant outcomes 
are set out in the Regulations. The guidance seems to suggest that this is done non-exhaustively,
102
 
but that is not clear from the text of the Regulations. The list is: managing and maintaining 
nutrition, maintaining personal hygiene, being appropriately clothed, developing and maintaining 
family/other personal relationships, being able to make use of the home safely, maintaining a 
habitable home environment, accessing and engaging in work, training, education or volunteering, 
‘making use of necessary facilities or services…including public transport, and recreational 
facilities or services’, and carrying out caring responsibilities for a child.103 There is no hierarchy of 
needs or aspects of well-being in the Act or Regulations.
104
 Where needs fluctuate, ‘the [LA] must 
take into account the adult’s circumstances over such period as it considers necessary to establish 
accurately the…level of need’.105 
The final requirement for eligibility is that as a result of being unable to achieve the 
outcomes, there is, or is likely to be, a significant impact on the adult’s well-being,106 as defined 
within the well-being principle.
107
 The LA will examine the cumulative effect of being unable to 
perform the relevant tasks. ‘Significant’ is left undefined in the Regulations, but ‘well-being’ seems 
to be at least partially subjective.
108
  
                                                 
102
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103
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104
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When making an eligibility determination, the LA must do so without taking account of the 
fact that needs are being met by an informal carer.
109
 The Act creates ‘the first ever entitlement to 
support for carers’,110 and the Impact Assessment expects this to be the main cost of implementing 
Part 1.
111
 Previously, there was no duty to provide services or apply an eligibility framework for 
carers,
112
 and the Department of Health’s guidance on the matter was non-statutory.113 Carers’ own 
eligibility for care and support, which is independent to the eligibility of the care recipient, will also 
be governed by the Care and Support (Eligibility Criteria) Regulations. The criteria are in some 
respects similar to those applied to a care recipient,
114
 although carers are at a two-fold advantage. 
They face fewer formal hurdles in demonstrating eligible needs (albeit that the substantive criteria 
may be harder to satisfy in particular circumstances) and they are less likely to be charged for 
support services. But this reflects the fact that, as the Government recognizes,
115
 the LA may 
experience a net gain if it provides a service to a carer rather than providing caring services itself to 
the person whom the carer had previously been looking after. There are also circumstances in which 
a service providing respite for a carer will be charged to the adult who directly receives the 
service.
116
 
When it has assessed an adult who appears to require care and support, an LA must meet 
eligible needs even where the adult’s assets exceed the threshold at which she would be expected to 
                                                 
109
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110
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111
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112
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114
 CSECR, r 3. 
115
 Department of Health (n 28) 9. 
116
 Department of Health (n 29) para 11.39. 
Final Version to be published in (2016) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 
 17 
fund her own care,
117
 although there currently remains an exception where the needs are to be met 
within a care home.
118
 The eventual right of ‘self-funders’119 to ask an LA to arrange care has been 
described as ‘important and groundbreaking’.120 There are some exceptions to this section 18 duty, 
relating to the ordinary residence of the relevant person,
121
 the lack of a desire for the LA to meet 
needs expressed by a self-funder,
122
 or the existence of an informal carer who is meeting the 
needs,
123
 or a person who is authorized or in a position to arrange care where the person lacks 
capacity.
124
 But beyond that, Spencer-Lane is clear that section 18 imposes ‘a strong and 
enforceable duty that is owed to the individual’, such that if its criteria are met LA resources are 
irrelevant.
125
  
In spite of its general insistence that the Act largely replicates current practice, the 
Government has admitted that it ‘is critical to the successful implementation of the…Act that [LAs] 
are…able to plan effectively for the changes required, and that funds be made available to deliver 
those changes within a constrained financial environment’.126 The Government tried to head off 
concerns that LAs would not be able to implement the reforms, or that there were problems with the 
new right of ‘self-funders’ (in the latter case arguing that the Act merely extended the right in 
                                                 
117
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118
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relation to non-residential care to cover residential care),
127
 but it was later forced to delay the 
implementation of the new right relating to residential care until April 2020 alongside the cap.
128
 
As regards the care plan detailing how needs are to be met, the new focus away from merely 
providing services is relevant. The Government disagreed with the Law Commission’s 
recommendation
129
 that the content of the plan should be set out in regulations, preferring that a few 
high-level items be set out in the Act itself.
130
 This may expand the ability to challenge the legal 
validity of such plans.
131
 
There is much emphasis in the guidance on involvement of the adult concerned. But as 
Slasberg and Beresford highlight, the final say about what a person’s needs are and how they should 
be met will remain with the LA,
132
 which is not necessarily consistent with a rights-based approach. 
The plan is subject to a ‘reasonableness’ standard133 and, in something of a contrast to the duty to 
meet eligible needs, resource considerations are relevant to how needs are to be met,
134
 even if the 
statutory guidance specifies that ‘the [LA] should not set arbitrary upper limits on the costs it is 
willing to pay to meet needs’135 and ‘there should be no constraint on how the needs are met as long 
as this is reasonable’.136  
                                                 
127
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128
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129
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130
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The overall result of the Care Act’s approach to social care, on Slasberg and Beresford’s 
analysis, is ‘a circular process…whereby “need” is defined by resource availability’ even given 
doubts about the relevance of resources to the needs assessment,
137
 with potential political 
advantages. It can certainly be said that the Act provides a clearer statutory footing for adult social 
care, but it is much less clear that this will have a significant impact on the nature and extent of care 
being provided in particular cases. 
 
B. Human Rights Arguments 
  
It is now necessary to turn to the compatibility of both the old and the new social care system with 
the ECHR, particularly as regards whether they provide(d) a sufficient standard of care to particular 
individuals. It must first be noted, however, that the use of the ECHR (ostensibly concerned with 
civil and political rights) to protect social and economic rights is controversial.
138
 Resource issues 
are among the difficulties,
139
 but King has suggested that ‘[i]f…interests are to ground social human 
rights claims and duties, then they must give rise to claims for resources required for a minimally 
decent life’.140 Murphy argues that ‘although the obvious sites for health rights…seem to be the 
European Social Charter system’ (inter alia providing for rights to social and medical assistance 
monitored by a European Committee of Social Rights) and other mechanisms outside the ECHR 
itself, ‘the [ECtHR] can claim to be a health-rights actor too’,141 albeit that the case law is 
‘challenging’ and the indirect protection of European Social Charter rights is for many either 
                                                 
137
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138
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‘unsatisfactory’ or ‘unappealing and unwelcome’.142 She still maintains that the case law (along 
with the actions of other bodies) ‘has disrupted an array of long-standing assumptions about health 
rights and…health rights justiciability’, such that ‘we can now have scrutiny and comparison vis-à-
vis both…existing forms of justiciability and the effects of other rights…on health and health 
care’.143  
For its own part, the ECtHR has said that ‘the mere fact that an interpretation of the 
Convention may extend into the sphere of social and economic rights should not be a decisive 
factor against [that] interpretation’, and ‘there is no water-tight division separating that sphere 
from…civil and political rights’.144 The most relevant Convention provision for present purposes is 
likely to be Article 8
145
 and its protection of the ‘right to respect for private and family life’.146 The 
ECtHR has held that ‘private life’ in Article 8 ‘is a broad concept which encompasses, inter alia, a 
person's physical and psychological integrity…; the right to “personal development”…; and the 
notion of personal autonomy’.147  
A public authority is nevertheless able to justify the limitation of an Article 8 right using 
Article 8(2) if it is done ‘in accordance with the law’ and is ‘necessary in a democratic society’ 
                                                 
142
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143
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144
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inter alia ‘in the interests of…public safety or the economic well-being of the country…for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.148 The 
interference so justified must be a proportionate means of achieving the relevant legitimate aim,
149
 
although the state’s ‘margin of appreciation’ is wide ‘in issues of general policy, including social, 
economic and health-care policies’.150 
 A useful contemporary example of judicial approaches to human rights in the context of 
adult social care, both domestically
151
 and in the ECtHR,
152
 is the case of Elaine McDonald. A 
severe stroke had limited Ms McDonald’s mobility, and she was unable safely to access a commode 
at night without the help of a carer. She also suffered from a small and neurogenic bladder, which 
caused a need to urinate two to three times per night. The necessary night-time carer had initially 
been provided by the LA on the basis that her need (assessed under section 47 of the National 
Health Service and Community Care Act 1990)
153
 was for assistance to reach a commode, but it 
then proposed that she used incontinence pads and absorbent bedding (even though she was not 
incontinent), which would eliminate the need for the carer and save the authority around £22,000. 
She was informed of the decision to reduce her care before several reviews of her care plan, which 
effectively changed the assessment of her needs and concluded that the use of pads was a practical 
and appropriate solution. Ms McDonald understandably considered this proposal ‘an intolerable 
                                                 
148
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149
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affront to her dignity’,154 but her claim of an Article 8 breach was dismissed entirely by a majority 
of the Supreme Court (alongside several other claims) and largely by the ECtHR. 
In the Supreme Court decision in McDonald, Lord Brown (with whom Lords Dyson and 
Walker agreed and Lord Kerr agreed on Article 8) stated that ‘[t]here is no dispute that in principle 
[Article 8] can impose a positive obligation on a state…to provide support [or] that the provision of 
home-based community care falls within the scope of the article’,155 provided Ms McDonald could 
establish ‘a direct and immediate link between the measures sought…and [her] private life’,156 and 
‘a special link between the situation complained of and the particular needs of [her] private life’.157 
Even if those links were present, however, Lord Brown emphasized the width of the margin of 
appreciation afforded by the Strasbourg court and rather dismissively described the ‘hopelessness’ 
of Ms McDonald’s case on Article 8.158  
A breach of Article 8 (but not Article 3)
159
 had been found in the earlier case of R (Bernard) 
v Enfield London Borough Council, where it was noted that ‘those entitled to care under s.21 [of the 
National Assistance Act 1948] are a particularly vulnerable group’, and that Article 8 gave rise to 
duties in relation to such people to take ‘[p]ositive measures…(by way of community care 
facilities)’.160 Sullivan J held that following its assessment the LA in Bernard ‘was under an 
obligation…to take positive steps, including the provision of suitably adapted accommodation, to 
enable the claimants and their children to lead as normal a family life as possible, bearing in mind 
                                                 
154
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the second claimant's severe disabilities’.161 In failing to comply, it had ‘condemned’ the claimants 
to living conditions making it ‘virtually impossible for them to have any meaningful private or 
family life’.162 The consequence of the difficulties caused was that the disabled wife often ended up 
urinating and defecating on the living room floor and could not play any real role in looking after 
the claimants’ children. Lord Brown, however, described the ‘striking…contrast between’ Bernard 
and the McDonald case before him.
163
 Moreover, in Anufrljeva v Southwark London Borough 
Council,
164
 which he described as ‘[t]he leading domestic case on the positive obligation to provide 
welfare support under article 8’,165 the Court of Appeal had somewhat implausibly held that an 
individual is unlikely to require welfare support under Article 8 unless his predicament engages 
Article 3 (which confers an absolute right but carries a ‘high threshold’),166 although it accepted that 
matters may differ where there are children and/or a family unit involved.  
In dismissing Ms McDonald’s claim, Lord Brown emphasized that the LA ‘went to great 
lengths…to consult the appellant and [her partner] about [her] needs and the possible ways of 
meeting them’.167 On his analysis, the authority ‘sought to respect as far as possible her personal 
feelings and desires, at the same time taking account of her safety, her independence and their own 
responsibilities towards all their other clients’, and ‘respected [her] human dignity and autonomy, 
allowing her to choose the details of her care package within their overall assessment of her 
needs’.168 He held that the claimant’s Article 8(1) rights had not even been interfered with, so that 
                                                 
161
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there was no need to justify the decision under Article 8(2), except for the period where the care 
provided was not in accordance with its own care plan.
169
 
Baroness Hale undertook a strong dissent in the Supreme Court. While she did not 
apparently address the Article 8 point directly, she clearly had it in mind and opined that ‘the need 
for help to get to the lavatory or commode is so different from the need for protection from 
uncontrollable bodily functions that it is irrational to confuse the two’,170 and suggested that the LA 
had failed to respect Ms McDonald’s dignity.171  
Although aspects of Baroness Hale’s judgment in McDonald drew unusually strong 
criticism from members of the majority in the Supreme Court,
172
 the ECtHR agreed with her 
implication that human dignity was engaged in a relevant sense and did not ‘exclude that the 
particular measure complained of by the applicant…was capable of having an impact on her 
enjoyment of her right to respect for private life’, finding that ‘the contested measure reducing the 
level of her healthcare [sic] falls within the scope of art 8’.173 It was ‘prepared to approach 
the…case as…involving an interference with the…right to respect for…private life, without 
entering into the question whether…art 8(1) imposes a positive obligation on…states to put in place 
a[n equivalent] level of entitlement’.174  
In R (on the application of Condliff) v North Staffordshire Primary Care Trust, however, 
consistently with Lord Brown’s analysis in McDonald, Toulson LJ had noted that the ECtHR ‘has 
                                                 
169
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been particularly wary of attempts to establish a positive obligation under article 8 in the area 
of…state benefits, because questions about how much money should be allocated…on competing 
areas of public expenditure, and how the sums allocated to each area should be 
applied,…essentially…lie in the political domain’.175 Toulson LJ claimed that ‘there is no reported 
case in which the court has upheld…a claim by an individual complaining of the state’s non-
provision of medical treatment’.176 In Sentges v Netherlands, for example, the ECtHR held that ‘[i]n 
view of their familiarity with the demands made on the health care system as well as with the funds 
available to meet [them],…national authorities are in a better position to carry out [the relevant] 
assessment than an international court’.177 
This trend is demonstrated by the ECtHR’s conclusion in McDonald.178 Despite the 
potential prima facie breach of Article 8(1), it accepted that ‘the interference pursued a legitimate 
aim, namely the economic well-being of the state and the interests of…other care-users’.179 It then 
considered whether ‘the decision not to provide…a night-time carer…was ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’…and…proportionate to the legitimate aim’.180 It concluded that both of those 
criteria were met having regard to the wide margin of appreciation, and was ‘satisfied that the 
national courts adequately balanced the applicant's personal interests against the more general 
interest of the…[LA] in carrying out its social responsibility’ of care provision ‘to the community at 
large’.181 The complaint in relation to the period after the care plan review was therefore manifestly 
ill-founded.  
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The ECtHR did find a breach of Article 8 as regards the period before the review, since then 
the LA was failing to provide care consistently with its own original assessment of needs. That was 
not ‘in accordance with the law’ for the purposes of Article 8(2),182 and the Court awarded €1,000 
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
183
 This conclusion, however, is consistent with Slasberg and 
Beresford’s suggestion that an LA need only modify its assessment of need to control the extent of 
its obligations.
184
 
Analysing the Supreme Court’s decision in McDonald, Carr opines that ‘the increasing 
reach of the [ECHR], in particular the potential ambit of Article 8, together with a recently 
implemented statutory framework designed to address discrimination and inequalities,
[185]
 opened 
up new legal possibilities to the Court, so there was some potential to address popular concern 
about adult social care’.186 She notes, however, that ‘[t]he legal reasoning of the majority 
demonstrated resistance to taking advantage of those opportunities’.187 Pritchard-Jones draws a 
similar conclusion about the ECtHR proceedings.
188
 It is particularly troubling that the majority of 
the Supreme Court were less willing to engage with Article 8 than the ECtHR even though the 
former were untrammelled by the difficulties of being a supranational court. 
                                                 
182
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  Clough and Brazier highlight the focus in the jurisprudence on procedural factors in the 
allocation of resources rather than the substantive scope of such decisions.
189
 That is evident in 
McDonald given the LA’s ability to render its actions compliant with the ECHR by reviewing Ms 
McDonald’s care plan in consultation with her and her partner.190 Clough and Brazier link the Care 
Act’s well-being principle to the protection of human rights.191 That said, they also acknowledge 
the limitations of simply stating human rights, advocating a more relational and contextual 
approach,
192
 and it could be argued that the somewhat paternalistic concept of well-being sits 
uneasily with that of rights. 
  For the moment, the utility of the ECHR in measuring or ensuring the adequacy of care 
provision under either the old or the new law is limited, and it would be unrealistic to suggest that a 
McDonald-like situation would be prevented by the Care Act. On O’Cinneide’s analysis, ‘when it 
comes to the substance of [resource allocation] decisions, in respect of which public authorities 
enjoy wide discretion, Convention rights have little, if any, purchase, and courts will only strike 
down a decision if it meets’ the standard of irrationality usually applied in judicial review193 
cases.
194
 This means that, ‘[i]n general, legal accountability mechanisms play a very limited role 
when it comes to resource allocation decisions that raise substantive issues of social justice’,195 
which severely limits the utility of human rights norms in the area of social care. 
                                                 
189
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 The next section of the article specifically considers the funding of social care under the 
Care Act, before considering its implications from a policy and human rights perspective within that 
realm.  
  
3. The Funding of Social Care 
 
A. The Care Act’s Reforms 
 
The funding of social care is a contentious issue, and one purpose of the Care Act is to reduce the 
controversy and the burden surrounding it for care recipients. It is significant, however, that no 
funding reform clauses were included in the draft Care and Support Bill.
196
 
 The charging regimes for health care and social care have been separate since the 
beginnings of the NHS,
197
 although there has been a ‘progressive withdrawal of the [NHS] from the 
provision of illness-associated care’.198 The National Health Service Act 2006 mandates that ‘[t]he 
services provided as part of the health service in England must be free of charge’ except where 
legislation expressly provides otherwise.
199
 By contrast, however, the Dilnot Commission on the 
Funding of Care and Support explained that ‘[v]ery broadly, under [the pre-Act social care] system, 
people with assets over £23,250 receive no financial state support and need to fund their own care’ 
and ‘[t]he level and type of state support for people with assets below this threshold depends on 
                                                 
196
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their needs and income’.200 It is also significant that, unlike the NHS budget, the adult social care 
budget is not ring-fenced.
201
  
 The starkness of the funding differences is not, however, reflected in the distinction between 
the types of care, which has been discussed in the previous section of the article. Spencer-Lane 
points to an example whereby health and social care can be provided by the same piece of 
equipment, which could create a funding problem.
202
 There is also controversy over NHS 
Continuing Healthcare, ‘a package of ongoing care…arranged and funded solely by the [NHS] for 
individuals outside a hospital setting who have complex ongoing healthcare needs, of a type or 
quantity such that they…have a “primary health need”…as a result of disability, accident or 
illness’.203 The King’s Fund describe NHS Continuing Healthcare as involving an ‘all or nothing’ 
assessment, whereby those who pass it receive free care and accommodation,
204
 but the 
Government rejected the suggestion that the power in what is now section 13(7) should be exercised 
to clarify the boundary between eligibility for LA-funded care and NHS-funded continuing 
healthcare.
205
 
Mayhew and Smith emphasize that ‘[a]…system for funding social care…along similar 
lines to the NHS…would involve a combination of higher taxes, more borrowing and/or redirecting 
public finances from other priority areas’,206 at a time of a perceived need for austerity and in which 
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LAs are already struggling to meet demands. Even so, the King’s Fund assert that pressures in 
health and social care and the needs of an ageing population ‘call for a response that goes well 
beyond patching up existing services and making the changes set out in the Dilnot report’.207 They 
make the bold claim that ’higher public spending on health and social care is affordable if it is 
phased in over a decade’ and recommend that it be funded ‘through tax and national insurance 
increases, reallocating funds from other areas of spending, and changes to prescription charges’.208 
For the time being, however, the marked distinction between the funding arrangements for health 
and social care looks set to stay. It is notable that the relevant Minister in the House of Commons 
expressed a determination to achieve free social care at the end of life, which could be provided for 
by regulation, but refused to commit the Government.
209
 One’s view on such matters will depend 
upon one’s position on the political spectrum, even if there must surely come a point where the 
need to protect human dignity transcends political and other differences.
210
 
 The charging and funding regime in the Care Act is nevertheless ‘intended to make charging 
fairer and more clearly understood by everyone’.211 Hopkins and Laurie describe it as ‘a significant 
rebalancing of the individual-state relationship in terms of responsibility for funding…social care, 
whilst maintaining the underlying model of funding through both individual and state 
contributions’.212 Many of the relevant principles are set out in the Care and Support (Charging and 
Assessment of Resources) Regulations,
213
 although the cap was the subject of a second consultation 
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ending several months before the delay in its implementation was announced, and those 
Regulations would need to be amended and supplemented before it could be introduced.
214
  
Under the regime that would be introduced by via the Care Act, based somewhat on the 
Dilnot Commission’s proposals but also delayed by the Government until 2020, people with assets 
of £118,000 (where the person’s home is included in the financial assessment; the figure is £27,000 
otherwise)
215
 will start to receive help with care costs if they need to go into a care home.
216
 
£17,000 would have been the new lower limit of the means test below which no contribution will be 
expected from the individual,
217
 increased from £14,250.
218
  
 It has been seen that the LA’s obligation to assess needs applies irrespective of the adult’s 
resources, and that the needs assessment will begin progress towards the new cap on lifetime care 
costs that an individual will have to bear. The cap was a central aspect of the Dilnot proposals and 
the Act.
219
 It was expected to be £72,000 for those developing eligible care needs after the age of 25 
if it was first introduced in April 2016,
220
 and it will be adjusted annually to account for inflation.
221
 
The Act places an LA under a duty to keep a ‘care account’ to measure progress towards the cap.222 
A ‘personal budget’ per se223 is necessary where an LA is meeting needs.224 It is a mechanism by 
                                                 
214
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which an individual can control the purchasing of care services…, which ‘can be taken…as a direct 
(cash) payment; as an account held and managed by the [relevant] council in line with the 
individual’s wishes;…as an account placed with a third party…and called off by the individual; or 
as a mixture of these’.225 The statutory guidance states that ‘[t]he personal budget must always be 
an amount sufficient to meet the person’s care and support needs, and must include the cost to the 
LA of meeting the person’s needs’.226 An ‘independent personal budget’227 will keep track of 
progress where an adult has eligible needs that the LA is not meeting.
228
 Relative progress towards 
the cap will be maintained after the annual adjustment.
229
 It is also significant that the LA’s own 
contributions towards the person’s care will count towards the cap, meaning that people within the 
means test will face a lower cap.
230
 The cap system has been criticized for being too complex for 
LAs to administer, given the tracking involved,
231
 though a proposal to focus on time receiving care 
at a substantial level rather than cost was rejected.
232
 
There is an obligation to carry out a full financial assessment where an LA identifies needs 
meeting the eligibility criteria and thinks that it would charge for meeting them,
233
 except where a 
light-touch assessment is appropriate or the adult is not co-operating.
234
 There must be regular 
                                                 
225
 HM Government, Caring for our Future: Reforming Care and Support (Cm 8378, 2012) 15 fn 22. 
226
 Department of Health (n 29) para 11-10. 
227
 Care Act 2014, s 29. 
228
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-331. 
229
 Care Act 2014, s 16(2). 
230
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-206; Department of Health (n 214) para 3.12. 
231
 HL Deb 16 July 2013, vol 74, col 698. 
232
 Spencer-Lane (n 2) para 1-203. 
233
 Care Act 2014, s 17(1)-(2). 
234
 CS(CAR)R, r 10; Department of Health (n 29) paras 8.22-8.26. 
Final Version to be published in (2016) 38(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 
 33 
reassessment of an adult’s ability to pay.235 It should be noted that each person must be assessed 
individually.
236
 Capital and income can be taken into account
237
 (except where disregarded), 
although the border between them is not watertight and the thresholds are based on capital.
238
 There 
is an obligation to charge only when capital limits are exceeded in the context of care homes,
239
 
although the Impact Assessment suggests that this will be removed and replaced with a discretion if 
the funding reforms come fully into effect.
240
 Local authorities will have quite some discretion 
concerning disregards, maximum charges etc., but the guidance urges them to exercise it 
consistently with reference to a developed policy.
241
 The Regulations appear similar to the old 
National Assistance (Assessment of Resources) Regulations.
242
 But it is significant and arguably 
beneficial to the rule of law and accessibility that non-residential care is also now subject to 
regulations rather than mere guidance, and the Impact Assessment notes that the Government has 
taken the ‘opportunity to make some minor adjustments’ even if those changes ‘are designed to be 
cost neutral’.243  
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The Regulations and guidance do not define ‘capital’ exhaustively, but the term generally 
‘refers to financial resources available for use and tends to be from sources…more durable than 
money in the sense that they can generate a return’.244 The value of capital is reduced to account for 
selling expenses, and by the amount of outstanding debts secured on the asset.
245
 Capital that is not 
immediately realisable is still included.
246
 A person is assessed on the basis of her actual and 
notional capital, which includes capital that would be available to the person if she applied for it, is 
paid to a third party in respect of a person, or the person has deliberately deprived herself of it to 
reduce liability.
247
 The value of notional capital is reduced by the difference between the weekly 
amount the person pays and the amount she would pay if the notional capital did not apply. 
A number of assets are disregarded for the purposes of assessing capital.
248
 Outside a care 
home context, assessment must exclude the adult’s main or only home.249 Even if the person is in a 
care home, there is a disregard if the person is there temporarily and intends to return to the main 
home or is taking reasonable steps to dispose of it, or the main home is occupied by a non-estranged 
partner, a single parent who is an estranged partner, a relative aged 60 or over or under 18, or who 
is incapacitated.
250
 There is a discretion to disregard the home in other circumstances, including 
where a relative moves into the property after the adult moves into a care home,
251
 but it should be 
                                                 
244
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noted that several categories of relative (who may be informal carers) are put at risk of losing their 
home by the social care system.  
There is also a 12-week disregard of the value of a property when the adult first enters a care 
home or another disregard ends unexpectedly because a qualifying relative dies or goes into a care 
home himself.
252
 There is a discretion in relation to other unexpected changes of circumstance.
253
 
There are also additional temporary disregards in relation to certain types of property.
254
  
Where a person has relevant assets between the lower and upper limit, the LA assumes that 
for every £250 of capital (or part thereof), the person can contribute £1 per week towards care costs. 
This is known as ‘tariff income’.255  
As regards income, it is significant that income from current employment
256
 and self-
employment is disregarded, and that these are widely interpreted.
257
 Most income from annuities,
258
 
insurance
259
 and benefits are included, but direct payments, armed forces compensation payments 
and the mobility component of a Disability Living Allowance or Person Independence Payment are 
fully disregarded along with a number of other types of income.
260
 Notional income is treated in 
essentially the same way as notional capital.
261
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There is also a binding ‘personal expenses allowance’ for someone in a care home that is 
disregarded.
262
 Outside a care home, a similar function is performed by the ‘minimum income 
guarantee’, which is set at the level of income support plus 25%.263 Where a person receives 
disability-related benefits, LAs are also advised to ensure that charging arrangements enable her to 
meet non-eligible needs.
264
 
Even before the full details of the new system were published and its full implementation 
was delayed, the King’s Fund emphasized that only the cost of meeting eligible needs would count 
towards the cap, which (as explained above) are likely to be critical or substantial and not low or 
moderate.
265
 There is also concern that personal budgets (and therefore progress towards the cap)
266
 
could be set below what it costs an individual to pay for care
267
 because the LA could secure 
cheaper provision itself.
268
 It should also be emphasized that the cap would exclude so-called 
‘general’ or ‘daily’ ‘living costs’ within a care home, and these were expected to be set at around 
£12,000 per year.
269
 These limitations on the cap would have left many people paying a 
considerable sum towards their care even if the cap were brought into effect.
270
 For example, the 
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Institute and Faculty of Actuaries has estimated that the minority of car recipients who do reach the 
cap will have spent an average of £140,000 before doing so.
271
 
 There are nevertheless some limits to LAs’ charging ability. Reablement services or 
equipment and minor adaptations to the home cannot be charged for.
272
 The LA cannot charge more 
than the service cost to provide, and cannot charge an administration fee, except in cases where a 
self-funder asks the LA to arrange the care and the fee represents actual costs incurred.
273
 Where an 
LA is charging an arrangement fee, this does not form part of the personal budget.
274
 
 Aside from the cap, a major area of funding reform within the Care Act relates to the 
offering of deferred payment agreements (‘DPAs’), allowing the payment of social care costs to be 
deferred (via a secured loan) until a point such as the death of the care recipient or the sale of her 
home.
275
 Despite their opposition to the cap, Hopkins and Laurie support the new principle of 
‘universal deferred payment’.276 As well as retaining a discretion to offer them, LAs will be prima 
facie obliged to do so to an adult whose needs are to be met in a care home, who has no more than 
£23,250 in assets excluding the home and whose home is not disregarded.
277
 This is significant 
because of the concern that people could be forced to sell their homes during their own lifetimes in 
order to pay for their care, although some have questioned the idea that people have really been so 
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‘forced’, and pointed to the possible advantages of doing so.278 In any case, Spencer-Lane notes 
several weaknesses in the old DPA scheme.
279
 There was no obligation on LAs to offer them, and 
the Impact Assessment for the Act reported a ‘wide variation in both the number of [DPAs] offered 
…and…the eligibility conditions attached’, such that only around 4,000 people entered them each 
year.
280
 In addition, LAs were not able to charge interest until after the person died, and preferred to 
use their general debt recovery powers because those allowed a charge to be placed on the home 
without consent.
281
  
 The Government reported that ‘[t]he majority of respondents were highly supportive of the 
overall intention to extend the deferred payments scheme’.282 There are nevertheless still concerns 
that the asset threshold for the mandatory offering of a DPA (effectively £23,250 in the first 
instance) and the apparent likelihood that only people with slightly more than that would be offered 
one on a discretionary basis effectively prevent the scheme from being universal, although the asset 
threshold could change. The Impact Assessment confirms that ‘self-funders would not be eligible 
for a deferred payment if they had more than £23,500 [sic] in savings’.283 While it justifies this on 
the basis that ‘[a]nyone above this threshold could…afford to pay for a year of…care out of their 
savings, without having to draw on their housing wealth’,284 there remains a significant 
limitation.
285
 The Impact Assessment also makes clear that ‘[LAs] will be required to seek adequate 
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security’ for a DPA,286 and can refuse to enter an agreement with someone who meets the general 
mandatory criteria if they are unable to obtain a first charge over the person’s property.287 The 
statutory guidance provides that the authority must also seek consent from anyone with a beneficial 
interest in the property.
288
 The guidance was amended inter alia to ensure that LAs ‘signpost’ 
people to independent financial advice (including regulated financial advice but where appropriate 
before taking out a DPA.
289
 The facilitation of access to independent financial advice is included 
within an LA’s information and advice-related obligations under section 4 of the Act, though there 
are concerns that the advice-related duty is general and does not seek to ensure that advice is 
received and understood.
290
 LAs’ powers to recover debts have at least been reformed with the aim 
of providing greater protection to individuals,
291
 but a DPA remains potentially prejudicial to the 
heirs of care recipients. 
The Government hoped that a market in insurance products would develop once the cap 
comes into effect, to help people pay for care.
292
 The King’s Fund, however, claims that there are 
‘no signs’ that such a market will develop.293 Mayhew and Smith innovatively propose new 
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Personal Care Savings Bonds that can be purchased and saved into to pay for future care,
294
 
expressing concern that ‘[i]f spending by the state and by the individual does not keep pace with 
need,…the quality and availability of care will suffer unless there are better mechanisms to help 
people support themselves’.295  
 Similarly, the House of Lords Select Committee on Public Service and Demographic 
Change noted that ‘[t]he proposals [now embodied in the Act etc.] are primarily concerned with 
redistributing the costs of care [and] do not bring extra funding into the system to tackle the current 
funding crisis,…or address the problem of expanding need in the coming decades’.296 Kelly fears 
that ‘[LAs] will acquire enhanced duties and responsibilities at the very time when they have been 
endeavouring to cope with…substantial reductions in their funding’ and ‘the means by which these 
radical reforms will be funded in the future is not yet final’.297 It has nevertheless been seen that the 
Government has sought to minimize the impact of the reforms in some respects. Conversely, £470 
million was announced for 2015-16 to cover the specific implementation of new duties and also to 
prepare for the expected further reforms in 2016-17.
298
  
 The next sub-section considers human rights and policy arguments surrounding the Act’s 
funding reforms in greater depth. 
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B. Human Rights and Policy Arguments 
 
The ECHR protects the property interests of individuals via Article 1 of its First Protocol,
299
 
although there is an overlap between funding and the Article 8 issues considered in the previous 
section of this article.
300
 Article 8’s distinctive protection for the ‘home’ might also be relevant, but 
it is ‘doubtful’ for these purposes that the necessary link is present for the care recipient herself (as 
distinct from an informal carer living in the same home) without ‘an intention to return to the home 
following a move into permanent residential care’.301 
In R (Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Lord Scott specifically said 
that ‘[t]he Convention does not require…states to have a national health scheme free at the point of 
need’.302 This was consistent with Pentiacova v Moldova, where it was also held that the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ afforded to individual states when implementing the ECHR was particularly wide 
when ‘issues involve an assessment of…priorities in the context of the allocation of limited State 
resources’.303 Nevertheless, the particular operation of the social care funding system in an 
individual case might still cause problems under the Convention. 
                                                 
299
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Article 1 of Protocol 1 provides that ‘[e]very natural or legal person is entitled to the 
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions’, and that ‘[n]o one shall be deprived of his possessions 
except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and…the general 
principles of international law’. It sets out, however, not ‘in any way’ to ‘impair the right of a State 
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the 
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions…’.304 It is in several 
respects a difficult Article.
305
 Allen details the controversy surrounding the very inclusion of a right 
to property in the Convention,
306
 although in his view it does not ‘represent a radical departure from 
traditional principles’ or ‘present a serious challenge [to] the existing…laws on property’.307 
The ECtHR summarized the judicially-developed principles on Article 1 of the First 
Protocol in Grudić v Serbia.308 It said that ‘[t]he first and most important requirement…is that any 
interference by a public authority with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions should be lawful’, and 
‘pursue a legitimate aim ‘in the public interest’’.309 Lawfulness requires ‘the existence of and 
compliance with adequately accessible and sufficiently precise domestic legal provisions’.310 The 
margin of appreciation is ‘wide’, and the legislature’s judgment as to what is ‘“in the public 
interest” should be respected unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation’.311 
                                                 
304
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That said, ‘[a]ny interference must also be reasonably proportionate to the aim sought to be 
realized’, meaning that ‘a “fair balance” must be struck between the demands of the general interest 
of the community and…the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’.312 It has specifically 
been held that ‘[t]he requisite balance will not be found if the person or persons concerned have had 
to bear an individual and excessive burden’.313 Allen notes that ‘[t]he legality principle is so easily 
satisfied that the doctrine of proportionality now performs some of the functions that might have 
been left to it’.314 
In Marckx v Belgium, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice said in his dissenting opinion that the ‘chief, if 
not the sole object of [Article 1] was to prevent the arbitrary seizures, confiscation, extortions, or 
other capricious interferences with peaceful possession’.315 He also said that ‘[t]o metamorphose it 
into a vehicle for the conveyance of rights that go far beyond the notion of the peaceful enjoyment 
of possessions, even if they are connected with property, is to inflate it altogether beyond its true 
proportions’.316 Nevertheless, Allen asserts that ‘the desire to apply overarching principles relating 
to discrimination and legality…led the Court to…review laws imposing taxes [under Article 1], 
despite the conceptual distinctions between liabilities and property rights’.317 
The alleged violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol was not examined in detail in 
Pentiacova v Moldova because the applicants eventually decided not to pursue that complaint in 
relation to their haemodialysis. Relevantly to this article, the Article 1 argument was based on the 
fact that the applicants had been ‘forced to spend their own money on their treatment and 
                                                 
312
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transportation’.318 That said, in Fratrik v Slovakia,319 the ECtHR held that an obligation to 
contribute to a health fund and a pension fund was an interference with the right to peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions. It was also the case that ‘[a] financial liability arising out of the raising of 
taxes or contributions may adversely affect the guarantee…under Article 1…if it places an 
excessive burden on the person…concerned or fundamentally interferes with his [or] her… 
financial position’.320 This is significant, even though no such burden was found on the facts and 
the application was declared manifestly ill-founded.
321
 Admittedly, however, in James v UK it was 
held that ‘[t]he taking of property in pursuance of a policy calculated to enhance social justice 
within the community can properly be described as being “in the public interest”’.322 If it is possible 
to justify interferences with property in the general or public interest,
323
 it may be particularly 
difficult to argue that there has been a violation of Article 1 of the First Protocol 1 where property is 
appropriated to pay for a service intended for that person’s own benefit, whether under the old or 
the new social care system. 
Domestically, it has been said that ‘dissatisfaction’ with the pre-Care Act funding situation 
‘reached such a point that…governments have tacitly accepted an obligation to safeguard 
[offsprings’] hopes of inheritance’, albeit with ‘no actual “right to inherit”’.324 The Labour peer 
Lord Campbell-Savours was critical of this notion during the passage of the Care Bill, claiming that 
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it would ‘simply transfer money from those without to those with’.325 Similarly, the legal scholars 
Hopkins and Laurie argue, with reference to theories of social citizenship and the social contract, 
that the 2014 Act (notwithstanding its current partially-implemented status) ‘reinforce[s] the 
expectation of leaving housing wealth as an inheritance which perpetuates inequalities across 
generations’, such that ‘the funding model provided by the Act is neither fair nor sustainable’.326 
They point to research suggesting an increased willingness among the population to use housing 
wealth to fund lifestyle choices but not welfare, and criticize the Care Act as ‘a missed opportunity 
to alter attitudes towards the use of personal resources to fund social care’.327 
In response to Lord Campbell-Savours, the Government claimed that ‘the vast majority of 
state support will be provided to the 40% of older people with the lowest income and wealth’.328 
The King’s Fund make the point that only around half of social care expenditure occurs in respect 
of those over 65, and claim that the argument that a means testing system for social care is fair 
because the principal beneficiaries of any more generous system are inheritors would be considered 
unacceptable in the context of health care.
329
 It is also true that, as the present author has argued 
elsewhere,
330
 some of those who stand to benefit from the estates of social care recipients could be 
worthy informal carers who have suffered disadvantages and saved further expenditure and use of 
scarce resources, albeit that such people should theoretically benefit from the non-funding 
provisions of the 2014 Act. 
From a human rights perspective, it seems unlikely that either the old or the new funding 
system would be held to violate Article 1 of the First Protocol, or indeed Article 8. It could be 
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argued, however, that the Care Act will make a breach even less likely if fully implemented. The 
Act has made the law more accessible and precise, which has been identified as important for the 
purposes of Article 1.
331
 It is also in principle possible that the enormous charges that might 
currently be imposed on an individual with a high level of need and significant available resources 
could have been regarded as an ‘individual and excessive burden’ in the context of a system where 
those with fewer needs and/or fewer resources are charged less. It appears that, under the current 
system, some people are at risk of losing up to 80% of their assets in paying for care.
332
 The cap on 
care costs, whatever its difficulties, would make the possibility of an arguable ‘individual and 
excessive burden’ less likely, as would the increased generosity of the means testing limits. 
Arguments based on inheritance, however, would always have been somewhat problematic for the 
purposes of the Convention, given that an inheritance is not a ‘possession’ for the purposes of 
Article 1 following Markcx v Belgium, although it was recognized that ‘the right to dispose of one's 
property constitutes a traditional and fundamental aspect of the right of property’.333  In any case, it 
could be argued that, following Aston Cantlow Parochial Church Council v Wallbank,
334
 an heir 
who ‘acquires’ a home subject to a social care charge acquires property that is already burdened 
(and in fact will not acquire a fully-fledged property right until the estate is duly administered),
335
 
so that he cannot use Article 1 of the First Protocol because that would confer property-related 
rights that did not already exist.
336
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A litigant might attempt a discrimination-oriented argument based on Article 14 of the 
ECHR (which is not a standalone Article but requires that ‘enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set 
forth in [the ECHR]…be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex [etc.]…or other 
status’) in conjunction with Article 1 of the First Protocol (or another Article), even if she cannot 
show that the substantive Article has been breached. Such an argument is made plausible by the 
irrelevance of individual resources to the NHS’s meeting of health-related needs and their high 
relevance to the social care provider’s doing so, in a manner that is apparently rarely found in other 
systems.
337
 Article 14 could also solve the problem with regard to inheritance identified above, as it 
did to some extent in Marckx v Belgium itself.
338
 
Consistently with Herring’s argument on the boundary between health and social care,339 the 
King’s Fund opine that ‘it is simply not acceptable that people with conditions that can involve very 
similar burdens – cancer and advanced dementia, for example – end up making very different 
contributions to the cost of their care’.340  In spite of their argument that even the Care Act imposes 
too onerous a burden on the state as compared to the individual, Hopkins and Laurie are forced to 
admit that ‘social care is closely allied to health care, both in its substance and in the public’s 
perception’,341 and that ‘the division between them is fuzzy’.342 It is also significant that the ECtHR 
itself referred to Elaine McDonald’s predicament as involving a ‘measure reducing the level of her 
healthcare’,343 notwithstanding the fact that it falls within social care as a matter of domestic law.  
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The extent of the apparent discrimination between users of the two types of service is 
arguably increased by the uncertain boundary between them, although given the deference shown 
under the ECHR in this area a substantive claim under Article 14 to this effect is unlikely to 
succeed. In Nitecki v Poland,
344
 the Court made an admissibility decision relating to Poland’s 
refusal to fund the full cost (rather than the 70% that it did refund) of a life-saving drug. The 
applicant unsuccessfully claimed violations of Articles 2, 8 and 14. The Court emphasized that 
Article 14 prohibited only ‘differences in treatment which have no objective or reasonable 
justification’, and found ‘such justification to exist in the…health care system which makes difficult 
choices as to the extent of public subsidy to ensure a fair distribution of scarce financial 
resources’.345 
The ultimate insult could be not only that the situation in McDonald could still happen under 
the Care Act and that it would apparently be perfectly compatible with the ECHR, but also that a 
care recipient in Ms McDonald’s situation could still be lawfully liable to make a financial 
contribution towards care that does not fully meet her needs. It does not appear that Ms McDonald 
herself was expected to contribute anything towards her care, and admittedly a care recipient 
wealthy enough to be charged even under the new means-tested threshold (if implemented) seems 
likely to choose to pay for care that meets her needs adequately. A person who is subjected to a 
negative resource allocation decision by an LA (such as those considered in Section 2) and does not 
have the means to pay for more suitable care is obviously more seriously prejudiced than someone 
who is merely caught by the charging regime, and Herring rightly recognizes the stronger claim of 
‘those seeking to protect…social care services for the poorest’.346 Matters will become particularly 
problematic, moreover, if LA resources are more stretched a result of people reaching the cap such 
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that LAs struggle more to meet the needs of those who literally cannot afford to pay for their care, 
although only a minority are likely reach the cap and the emphasis is on ensuring that ‘everyone 
will benefit from knowing that they will be covered’.347 It is still significant that extra care paid for 
by a wealthier person would not contribute to progress towards the cap if the needs were not 
considered eligible or an LA would have spent less in meeting eligible needs. The fact remains that 
the new system could fail fully to meet the needs of a social care recipient in a manner consistent 
with her dignity and charge her for the privilege of enduring that failure. Unless Baroness Hale’s 
approach is somehow resurrected, taken seriously and applied to Article 8, the ECHR can do little 
to help. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Amongst its analysis of the detail of the new social care legislation, and the regulations and 
guidance required to implement it, this article raises difficult questions about the proper role of a 
doctrinal legal scholar in evaluating law that is so inherently bound up with politics, social policy 
and public expenditure, notwithstanding the fact that social care raises important issues for those 
concerned with black-letter property law. The article has attempted to evaluate the Care Act against 
the benchmark of the ECHR. That evaluation has demonstrated the limitations of such an approach 
in the context of the most influential human rights treaty within English Law. The reality is that the 
old system was systemically consistent with the ECHR (even if there could be breaches in 
individual cases) as regards its protection of both the right to respect for private life and that to 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions, particularly given the deferential approach of the ECtHR on 
matters such as health and social care. The new system heralded by the Care Act will make 
compatibility more likely if fully implemented, but viewed from a human rights perspective its 
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impact appears limited in some respects even though it has formally extended the human rights 
protection offered to social care recipients in others. The combined effect of LA discretion, 
underinvestment and the imposition of asset-based welfare caused by the continuing liability to pay 
for social care (and not health care, for example) using one’s own property still supports the claim 
that the normative rights and the inherent dignity of some individuals are prejudiced by the system, 
although the decline in home ownership may ultimately reduce the scope for the Act to interfere 
with property rights for generations to come.
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